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Climate change has become one of the biggest developmen-
tal challenges facing the planet. The challenges are even more 
pronounced and significant for the African continent, because 
of its levels of poverty and low capacity to adapt. . . . Time has 
now come that we collectively as nations [and] individually in 
our right have to do something to avert consequences of climate 
change in order to avoid a future catastrophe. We need to act 
now, because if we do not, the development gains that we have 
attained in our countries will be lost, thereby leaving more peo-
ple in poverty. – Dr. Bingu wa Mutharika1
InTroducTIon
Over the past decade or so, climate change has been regu-larly cited as one of the biggest impediments to Africa’s realization of sustainable growth and development.2 In 
particular, African leaders have been warned that, in light of the 
immense challenges posed by the phenomenon, the continent 
stands a very marginal chance of making meaningful progress 
towards achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(“MDGs”) by 2015.3 It cannot be gainsaid that these warnings 
are not without basis. Climate change commands significant 
influence on Africa’s performance; it portends innumerable 
socio-economic and political challenges for the continent, which 
has perennially garnered “breaking news” coverage largely for 
the appalling humanitarian catastrophes on its soil.
Though it contributes only about 3.8% of the total green-
house gas (“GHG”) emissions,4 the continent constantly experi-
ences the adverse impacts of climate change, as a result of its 
high poverty levels and low capacity to adapt.5 For example, 
the continent’s food security situation has continually worsened 
as the productivity of rain-fed agriculture, the main source of 
livelihood for most Africans, frequently slumps due to erratic 
rainfall patterns;6 massive livestock losses have been caused by 
successive prolonged droughts in virtually every corner of the 
continent;7 sea level rise (leading to coastal erosion) and flood-
ing (even in areas that never before experienced floods) have 
become a common sight;8 persistent and new health problems 
are increasingly reported in virtually every corner of the vast 
continent;9 and violent conflicts have become the order of the 
day as environmental migrants and local communities clash over 
control of, or access to, resources.10 Worryingly, the effects of 
climate change have proved to be akin to Russian roulette, with 
every pull of the trigger posing risks for all, and the poor bearing 
the heaviest brunt because of their dependence on the surround-
ing environment for their survival.11
afRica anD the climate chanGe aGenDa: 
huRDleS anD pRoSpectS in SuStaininG the outcomeS of the Seventh  
afRican Development foRum
by James Forole Jarso (HSC)*
Today, issues relating to climate change are addressed in a 
plethora of treaties adopted within the United Nations (“UN”) 
framework. These international instruments include the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”),12 
which was adopted at the landmark UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development (“Earth Summit”) in 1992 as part of 
the package to save the planet along with the UN Convention 
to Combat Desertification (“Desertification Convention”),13 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”), which 
seeks to ensure conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, 
as well as fair and equitable sharing of the benefits of genetic 
resources.14 Other instruments related to climate change which 
were subsequently created include the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC (“Kyoto Protocol”),15 which establishes legally bind-
ing obligations for the developed countries to reduce their GHG 
emissions and, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (“Cartagena 
Protocol”), which was adopted (as a supplement to the CBD) 
to protect biodiversity from the potential risks posed by living 
modified organisms (“LMOs”) resulting from modern biotech-
nology.16 In their formal acknowledgment of the importance of 
climate change issues, African countries have overwhelmingly 
subscribed to these instruments.17
Africa’s predicament has received formal acknowledge-
ment in various circles. Within the inter-governmental African 
Union (“AU”) framework, on several occasions climate change 
has garnered the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (“the Assembly”). For instance, in January 2007, 
the Assembly called upon the AU Member States to integrate 
climate change into their respective national development pro-
grams.18 In February 2009, the Assembly emphasized the need 
for international climate change negotiations to give Africa an 
opportunity to demand compensation for damage caused by 
global warming.19 More importantly, the Assembly approved 
the Algiers Declaration on Climate Change (“Algiers Decla-
ration”),20 thereby paving way for the building of a common 
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African Position in preparation for the fifteenth Conference of 
the Parties to the UNFCCC (“COP-15”).21
In July 2009, the Assembly, among other things: 1) estab-
lished the Conference of African Heads of State and Gov-
ernment on Climate Change (“CAHOSCC”)22 to spearhead 
leadership in the climate change negotiation process;23 2) urged 
the CAHOSCC, all ambassadors, and negotiators to use the 
approved African Common Position24 to achieve optimal results 
for the continent;25 and 3) authorized the AU Commission to 
facilitate the AU’s accession to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, and the CBD.26 Then, in February 2010, the Assembly 
requested the CAHOSCC to establish a streamlined single nego-
tiating structure at both Ministerial and Expert levels.27
At the inter-ministerial level of the African Ministerial Con-
ference on the Environment (“AMCEN”), climate change issues 
were addressed on a number of occasions. The agenda was offi-
cially floated at the Conference’s twelfth session in Johannesburg, 
laying the groundwork for the preparation of a common conti-
nental position on climate change.28 Shortly thereafter the special 
session on climate change, which also had the African Group of 
Negotiators in attendance, adopted the Nairobi Declaration on the 
African Process for Combating Climate Change,29 which, among 
other things: 1) noted with concern the inadequacy, complexity, 
and fragmentation of the existing climate financing mechanisms, 
as well as the constraints faced by African countries in access-
ing these facilities;30 2) reaffirmed the adoption (by the Assembly) 
of the Algiers Declaration, and “the need [for African countries] 
to speak with one voice in the negotiations process for the new 
legally binding global climate change regime;”31 3) stressed that 
“Africa’s priorities are to implement climate change programmes 
on adaptation . . . , in particular to alleviate poverty and attain 
the Millennium Development Goals, with emphasis on the most 
vulnerable groups, especially women and children;”32 and 4) rec-
ognized the need “to ensure coordination and coherence in the 
implementation” of existing climate change adaptation and miti-
gation actions in Africa.33
Within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (“NEPAD”),34 the Action Plan of the Environ-
ment Initiative affirms the continent’s concerns vis-à-vis the 
challenges posed by climate change, and provides for climate 
change as one of the core priority areas to be addressed by the 
continent’s leadership.35 On the realization that climate change 
poses a key challenge to environmental sustainability, biodiver-
sity, and food security in Africa, through its Climate Change and 
Natural Resource Management program, NEPAD provides a 
platform on which the continent’s players share knowledge and 
experiences in addressing the fast-creeping threat.36
Climate change issues have equally garnered the atten-
tion of various forums, in particular the African Development 
Forum (“ADF”), a biennial multi-stakeholder gathering commit-
ted to building consensus and mobilizing partners for Africa’s 
development. The 2010 Seventh African Development Forum 
(“ADF VII”), whose theme was “Acting on Climate Change for 
Sustainable Development in Africa,” was jointly organized by 
the Addis Ababa-based UN Economic Commission for Africa 
(“UNECA”), the AU Commission, and the Tunis-based African 
Development Bank (“AfDB”).37 The participants, drawn from 
diverse stakeholders,38 deliberated on the challenges and oppor-
tunities presented by climate change in Africa, and, after the 
five days of intensive panel discussions and parallel sessions, 
adopted a common statement (“Consensus Statement”) with 
some fifty-six points of agreement.39
This article aims to unearth the challenges and prospects 
in sustaining the outcomes of these principled negotiations for 
the African continent to make lasting progress in addressing the 
effects and impacts of climate change and variability.
undersTandInG The Forum
on the foRum GeneRally
The African Development Forum (“ADF”) is a joint ini-
tiative of UNECA, the AU Commission, and the AfDB.40 It is 
Africa’s pioneer multi-stakeholder platform established with a 
view to establishing a consensual African-driven development 
agenda, and mobilizing partners for Africa’s development.41 
Every forum has a designated theme, on which deliberations 
are based. Initially, it was intended that the Forum be convened 
annually. However, after the second ADF, in 2000, the partici-
pants agreed that the Forum be convened biennially. Thus, the 
third ADF was held in 2002, instead of 2001. The seventh ADF 
VII was recently held in October 2010 and the eighth ADF VIII 
is slated for 2012.
aDf vii: a contextual oveRview
Thematic Focus of the Forum
ADF VII was devoted to discussions on climate change and 
participants were tasked to examine the challenges and opportu-
nities presented by the phenomenon, with a view to, within the 
global context, identifying long-term actions to ensure Africa’s 
development process is climate resilient.42 The discussions were 
carried out against the backdrop of the realization that climate 
change is one of the biggest threats to sustainable growth and 
development in Africa.
Objectives of the Forum
Generally, ADF VII was intended to provide a multi-
stakeholder platform to discuss and build consensus on how to 
mainstream climate change concerns into development policies, 
strategies, programs and practices in Africa, and to strengthen 
the African Common Position to ensure that it adequately 
reflected the continent’s concerns and priorities in the on-going 
international climate change negotiations.43
Specifically, the Forum was convened to accomplish sev-
eral goals. First, it considered the evidence and impacts of cli-
mate change in Africa and the need for adequate information and 
services to better inform decision-making and actions.44 Sec-
ond, it deliberated on the challenges and opportunities climate 
change poses in Africa and policy-making,45 while promoting 
cooperation in sharing of best practices and lessons-learned.46 
Finally, within the framework of the demonstrated evidence and 
impacts of, as well as the challenges and opportunities presented 
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by, climate change, the Forum defined priority actions and 
measures, built new strategic alliances and partnerships, and 
provided momentum for the African Common Position, in prep-
aration for the sixteenth Conference of the Parties (“COP-16”) 
in Cancún, Mexico.47
adF vII: hIGhlIGhT oF The key ouTcomes
On the premise of the evidence presented, which reflected 
climate change as a serious, urgent, and compelling reality in 
Africa,48 the participants concluded the Common Statement, 
which embodies some fifty-six points of agreement. The key 
ones are highlighted below.
conSenSuS on the afRican common poSition
With a view to enhancing the continent’s position in the 
international climate change processes, ADF VII participants 
agreed that African countries and their leadership should engage 
all relevant stakeholders in the on-going climate change discus-
sions, and in particular, build the continent’s capacity through a 
coordinated, effective, and representative position to effectively 
participate in the relevant international negotiations, in order to 
ensure that the outcomes reflect the continent’s concerns and pri-
orities.49 The agreement also pledged to support implementation 
of decisions and resolutions of the AU Assembly, the AMCEN, 
and other relevant continental bodies in regard to climate change 
concerns for the continent.50
Leadership for Climate Change Response
On the understanding that African leaders and their devel-
opment partners have critical roles to play in implementing 
Africa’s climate change agenda, participants also agreed that 
African leaders and their development partners should strongly 
support the CAHOSCC to enable it to effectively mobilize polit-
ical commitment and provide effective political leadership. Fur-
ther, there were pledges to demonstrate additional leadership.51 
These included commitments relating to: 1) taking bold deci-
sions on the issue of innovative climate change financing mech-
anisms, including proper carbon pricing to complement funding 
under the UNFCCC;52 2) educating the public to enhance under-
standing of climate change and variability; 3) garnering support 
necessary to meet national commitments; and 4) addressing the 
fallacy that developed countries only have a charitable obliga-
tion to finance climate change actions in developing countries.53
The Role of the Private Sector
On the understanding that the private sector54 has a vital role 
to play in addressing climate change in Africa, the participants 
agreed that African governments should “create an enabling 
policy environment to encourage the private sector to harness 
its expertise, resources and creativity.”55 Related to this pledge, 
there was agreement to create and develop partnerships between 
public, private, and civil society stakeholders.56
Further, the participants called on African governments 
to “establish minimum standards for local and Foreign Direct 
Investments” (“FDIs”) that were appropriate for both national 
needs and the private sector.57 Finally, there was a pledge to 
“encourage research and development that will create Africa-
specific technological solutions . . . taking into account [the con-
tinent’s] rich indigenous knowledge systems.”58
key outcomeS on fooD SecuRity anD economic 
Development59
In the Consensus Agreement, ADF VII participants pledged 
a number of sector-specific actions, including in agriculture, 
food security, and infrastructure. For instance, in order to 
improve the continent’s approach in addressing agriculture and 
food security challenges, the Agreement called on African coun-
tries to take a “holistic approach;” seek a strong, fair, and com-
prehensive future agreement on payment systems for agriculture 
sector emissions;60 improve and grow “index-based insurance 
schemes and safety nets;” and accelerate initiatives aimed at 
reducing dependence on rain-fed farming.61
In addition, to address the adverse impacts of climate 
change on the continent’s infrastructure development efforts, 
the agreement called on African governments to “climate-proof 
their water infrastructure,” promote more sustainable demand, 
increase efficiency, increase rain-water harvesting, and sup-
port more successful water management at all levels, including 
for states sharing water resources, notably rivers.62 In addition, 
the agreement pledged to adopt a “holistic approach” to pro-
mote low-carbon energy sources and technology, and “to sup-
port the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 
(“PIDA”)63 to ensure development of the continent’s priority 
infrastructure projects.64
outcomeS on human Development, SecuRity, anD 
ecoSyStem SuStainability
In their resolve to address the social and human develop-
ment challenges posed by climate change,65 the participants 
agreed to “employ . . . a human rights-based approach (HRBA) 
in climate change mitigation and adaptation policies.”66 The 
agreement pledges the governments to support an “equity-based 
health care financing in climate change funding mechanisms 
and internal resource mobilization.”67 There was also a pledge 
to comprehensively incorporate gender perspectives in develop-
ment, encourage eco-friendly development and awareness, and 
promote “youth-led actions and processes.”68
Further, the participants agreed that, in order to address the 
peace and security issues posed by climate change,69 African 
countries should “engage in preventive diplomacy,”70 in part 
through the Climate for Development in Africa (“ClimDev-
Africa”) Programme, to effectively address the interface 
between climate change, peace and security issues, and disaster 
response.71 The agreement also proposed amending the African 
Union Protocol on peace and security,72 and tasked the AU Peace 
and Security Council (“PSC”) to, in its work, take into account 
climate-related peace and security issues, including migration.73
Finally, in their efforts to address the impacts of climate 
change on ecosystem sustainability,74 African governments 
agreed to promote effective and sustainable human-centered eco-
system management,75 encourage the use of Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Plus (“REDD+”) 
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initiatives to reduce poverty, and implement the UNFCCC, the 
CBD, and the Desertification Convention “in a synergistic man-
ner to promote coherent [environmental] management.”76
outcomeS on haRneSSinG meanS of ReSponSe to 
climate chanGe: financinG, RiSk manaGement, 
Science & technoloGy, anD capacity builDinG
It was agreed that, in order to improve financing for climate 
change actions in Africa,77 African governments and their devel-
opment partners should promote financial reform to enhance 
funding access for Africa, in particular by identifying and pri-
oritizing efficient financial resource distribution, in part through 
newly forged Public-Private Partnerships. The agreement also 
“strongly supports” the establishment and setting up of the pro-
posed African Green Fund (“AGF”),78 which is expected to 
coordinate and manage climate financing on the continent.
In addition, the participants agreed that to improve the con-
tinent’s capacity to manage the risks of climate-related disas-
ters,79 African governments should strengthen the national 
institutions generating and handling climate-related data, and 
promote the exchange of this information. The agreement also 
calls for promotion of broad cooperation in sharing climate-
related knowledge (through early warning systems) and disaster 
management, and strengthening of surveillance and monitoring 
systems across all regional levels.80 It also calls for promotion of 
index-based insurance in arid and semi-arid areas,81 as well as 
promotion of integration of climate risk management (“CRM”) 
in all levels of education and all levels of policy-making.82
Further, to improve the continent’s level of scientific and 
technological innovativeness to respond to climate change,83 
the participants agreed that African countries should “build 
a regional climate change knowledge repository,”84 invest in 
scientific research and development,85 and support and priori-
tize disaster risk-management and preventive capacity. On the 
international level, the agreement seeks to promote the pursuit 
of technology transfer and global partnerships to that end.86 
Finally, the Agreement promotes the strengthening of African 
universities and research and technology centers to “increas[e] 
their competitiveness in the global market.”87 To improve 
Africa’s capacity to respond to climate change,88 the agree-
ment pledged that African countries, with the support of their 
development partners, should strengthen CRM-related national 
institutions, including educational institutions at all levels, and 
improve the capacity of vulnerable groups;89 and foster South-
South cooperation.90
susTaInInG The ouTcomes: a realITy check
pRactical challenGeS in SuStaininG the outcomeS
Impotent Political Leadership
Africa lacks credible leadership to address climate change. 
The political leaders are yet to effectively walk their unending 
talks; save for the multitude of pious resolutions,91 there is no 
concrete effort to deal with the fast-unfolding crisis. In fact, 
the continent’s affairs have been reduced to endless spirals of 
meetings and deliberations, only to come up with more meet-
ings. It is this circus that has, for instance, delayed the estab-
lishment of the AGF.92 In general, the continent’s leadership 
lacks the requisite political will to steer the continent to the path 
of sustainable growth and development, with mere rhetorical 
promise to tackle the climate change-related challenges engulf-
ing the continent.
Further, leadership has been lacking in preventing the 
destruction of the continent’s ecosystems, and in mitigating 
poverty and hunger, two of the biggest drivers of environmental 
destruction on the continent. For instance, in the fast-evolving 
“global land rush,” millions of African farmers have lost their 
arable lands to foreign investors.93 These deals, often shrouded 
in veils of secrecy, have violated the resource rights of millions 
of poor Africans, fuelling poverty and food insecurity,94 two of 
the biggest drivers of environmental destruction on the African 
continent. Furthermore, as vast forestlands (and other ecosys-
tems that act as carbon sinks) are opened up to large-scale farm-
ing, the continent continues to be exposed to further threats of 
climate change. Sadly, attempts by environmental activists to 
resist the deals are often forcibly countered by the concerned 
governments.95
Against this backdrop and in the absence of committed and 
visionary leadership, it cannot be denied that at both regional and 
national levels it would be an exercise in futility to attempt sus-
taining the outcomes of ADF VII. Sadly, if African leaders con-
tinue to act in the way they are currently, the Consensus Statement 
may as well land in the heap of unimplemented texts on climate 
change, only to gather dust and be forgotten altogether.
Corruption and Economic Mismanagement
Corruption may be the most talked about problem in most 
African countries, many of which have been poorly managed for 
the better part of their post-independence histories. As we begin 
the twenty-first century, unfortunately, not much has changed; 
most of the leaders still use their official positions for self-
aggrandizement, as opposed to public service.96 In fact, over 
the years, many African countries have perpetually ranked very 
poorly on Transparency International’s corruption scorecard.97
In both the public and private spheres, the vice has greatly 
undermined the continent’s growth and development prospects, 
while exacerbating the costs and effects of climate change.98 
Undoubtedly, the resulting impoverishment, dilapidation of 
basic infrastructure, and decay of the social justice system, 
among many other associate evils, will adversely undermine 
the affected population’s resilience to shocks related to climate 
change. More importantly, corruption affects the flow of financ-
ing for addressing climate change.99 These are real challenges 
that starkly stand in the path to effectuation of the outcomes of 
ADF VII.
Continued Impoverishment and Worsening Food 
Insecurity
For decades, Africa has unsuccessfully struggled to eradi-
cate poverty.100 Closely intertwined with, and largely culmi-
nating from, poverty is chronic food insecurity, a situation that 
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has seen millions of Africans deprived of food, the most basic 
necessity in life. According to a recent estimate by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) of the UN, Africa hosts 
approximately thirty percent of the world’s hungry popula-
tion—about 276 million Africans face hunger.101 The causes are 
many and complex, and include corruption, protracted armed 
conflicts, economic and political marginalization, and continued 
desertification.
Unfortunately, the millions condemned to perpetual poverty 
and chronic food insecurity have often turned to various forms of 
environmentally harmful means of survival, including charcoal 
burning, fuel-wood vending, logging, and encroachment on for-
ests and other sensitive ecological zones to open up more farm-
lands. These actions will undoubtedly exacerbate the impacts of 
climate change in the affected areas, thereby portending a vis-
ible challenge to sustenance of the outcomes of ADF VII.
The Culture of Marginalization
Discussions on climate change issues in Africa are largely 
dominated by the political elites and their ilk.102 Many have been 
left out of the process. In particular, groups that have remained 
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change (like indig-
enous peoples, women, children, and the youth) have been 
pushed to the peripheries of the discussion, and millions of Afri-
cans have had no effective voice in the process.103 This has fur-
ther led to a number of individuals and communities expressing 
skepticism of the nexus between the environment and climate 
change, thereby dismissing claims that the current problems are 
attributable to man’s activities.104
These challenges, which were expressly acknowledged at 
ADF VII,105 cannot be wished away even in the post-Forum 
periods, for they portend a serious challenge to effectuating the 
outcomes of the Forum. Indeed, it need not be emphasized that 
addressing these challenges will greatly contribute to sustenance 
of the outcomes.
Global Inaction and Unreliable Pledges
Africa’s efforts to address climate change issues cannot suc-
ceed if treated in isolation of the global trends. Further, we must 
not forget that, contributing only about 3.8% of the global GHG 
emissions,106 Africa is suffering the wrongs of others, and even 
if it were to fully tackle climate change in its domain, its efforts 
would not be more than a drop in the ocean. In light of this, a 
cursory view of the prevailing global practices reveals a mixed 
track record, with non-commitment surfacing at various times.
For instance, the commitment of some developed coun-
tries to address climate change in developing countries has 
been merely rhetorical; some of them have yet to honor their 
pledges under the current global financing mechanism.107 This 
has resulted in inadequate, unpredictable, and unreliable financ-
ing for climate change actions in Africa, as in other developing 
countries.108 The World Bank too has not been straightforward 
in its dealing with (and in) developing countries; through its sub-
sidiaries, it continues to finance the “global land rush”109 and 
other projects that would likely contribute to climate change.110
Surely, if Africa is to meaningfully address climate change, 
and if the outcomes of ADF VII are to be sustained, adequate, 
predictable, and reliable, financing for climate change actions is 
indispensable. Otherwise, in the absence of such external financ-
ing support and recognizing that most climate change actions 
are largely capital-intensive, Africa may be able to only do very 
little, if anything, to manage climate change on its own.
pRoSpectS in SuStaininG the outcomeS
Proliferation of Climate Funds
Over the last few years, we have witnessed proliferation of 
climate funds, a handful of which have benefited (or are expected 
to benefit) the African continent in its efforts to implement vari-
ous climate change mitigation and adaptation actions. Such fund-
ing regimes include the Clean Technology Fund (“CTF”),111 the 
Special Climate Fund (“SCF”),112 the Kyoto Protocol Adapta-
tion Fund,113 the Congo Basin Forest Fund (“CBFF”),114 the 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (“FCPF”),115 the Global 
Environment Facility Trust Fund (“GEF Trust Fund”),116 the 
Global Climate Change Alliance (“GCCA”),117 the Least Devel-
oped Countries Fund (“LDCF”),118 and the Special Climate 
Change Fund (“SCCF”).119 These funding efforts received a 
major boost when the establishment of a “Green Climate” Fund 
was proposed at the recently concluded COP-16.120
It cannot be denied that, the dissatisfactions notwithstand-
ing,121 cumulatively, these initiatives can greatly contribute 
to Africa’s cause to address the challenges posed by climate 
change. If well harnessed, these funding mechanisms have the 
potential to significantly contribute to the sustaining the out-
comes of ADF VII.
Developments within the AU Framework
A number of recent developments within the AU frame-
work hold some positive prospects in sustaining the ADF VII 
Outcomes. For instance, on October 13, 2010, at a ceremony 
on the sidelines of ADF VII, the AU Commission, the AfDB, 
and UNECA launched the Climate for Development in Africa 
(“ClimDev-Africa”) Programme,122 which aims at strengthen-
ing the climate-resilience of economic growth and the MDGs 
through mainstreaming of CRM in sensitive sectors. Shortly 
thereafter, in November 2010, under the auspices of the AU 
Conference of Energy Ministers (“CEMA”), the AU Commis-
sion, the AfDB, and UNECA jointly hosted the First All-Africa 
Energy Week 2010 (“AAEW”), a high-level stakeholder forum 
for monitoring progress, taking stock, undertaking constructive 
dialog, and sharing knowledge, with the aim of enhancing uni-
versal energy access.123
In addition, on November 4, 2010, the AfDB launched the 
African Carbon Support Project (“ACSP”), which is designed 
to assist project developers in the continent in accessing carbon 
finance to ensure commercial viability of their projects.124 Most 
recently, on December 6, 2010, the AfDB representatives joined 
representatives from other Multilateral Development Banks in a 
joint side event of the COP-16, whose theme was “Scaling-up 
International Climate Finance.”125
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By and large, their individual merits or otherwise notwith-
standing, these initiatives hold immense potential to sustain the 
outcomes of ADF VII, as well as other regional commitments 
to address challenges related to climate change and variability.
The Cancún Gains
Though heavily criticized as having yielded too little,126 
COP-16 heralded a number of gains with potential to contrib-
ute to sustenance of the Outcomes of ADF VII. For instance, 
though not legally binding, the Cancún Agreement reflects some 
level of changing relations between developing countries and 
the developed countries; it embodies a “fairly modest” deal on 
reduction of emissions, calling on developed countries to reduce 
their GHG emissions (as pledged in the Copenhagen Accord).127 
The Agreement also proposes the establishment of a “Green 
Climate” Fund, which is intended to assist developing countries 
finance emission reductions and adaptation actions.128
Contributions of the Civil Society and the Private 
Sector
The African private sector and the civil society, though long 
excluded from the mainstream discussions, currently play indis-
pensable roles in addressing climate change issues on the con-
tinent. While the civil society has been particularly involved in 
lobby and advocacy activities,129 the private sector has proved 
critical in supplementing the existing global climate financing 
initiatives.130 For instance, on June 5, 2008, the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation—through 
their Nairobi-based Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(“AGRA”)—established the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund 
(“AECF”) to leverage private sector and donor funding for suc-
cessful eco-friendly projects and enterprises.131
SuStaininG the outcomeS: the way foRwaRD
In order to sustain the various outcomes of ADF VII, Afri-
can governments should, as a matter of priority, implement a 
number of measures. Though not offered as an absolute panacea 
for the climate change problem in Africa, these measures are 
believed to wield immense potential to sustain the outcomes and 
other related initiatives to address the challenges posed by cli-
mate change and variability on the continent.
First and foremost, they must back up their words with 
action—moving from the unending official rhetoric to offer-
ing effective leadership in addressing issues related to climate 
change. In particular, they have to link the continent’s Common 
Position and the prevailing regional, sub-regional, and national 
policies, strategies, practices, and programs. Second, they have 
to fully commit themselves to the fight against corruption, 
ensure proper targeting of funds received under the prevailing 
climate funds regimes, and establish effective normative and 
institutional frameworks. Third, they have to fully commit them-
selves to the fight against poverty, also through the establish-
ment of appropriate normative and institutional approaches, and 
with adequate budgetary focus.
Fourth, they must profile climate change as a human 
rights issue and nurture a sustainable culture of human rights, 
in particular through mainstreaming of human rights concerns 
into all regional, sub-regional, and national polices, strategies, 
practices, and programs. Indeed, climate change issues have 
to be effectively integrated in litigations on the environment, 
with effective remedies for any resulting violations of environ-
mental rights. Fifth, African governments need to effectively 
leverage the window of opportunity availed by climate change 
and variability, in particular the opportunity to establish green 
economies.
Sixth, African governments have to consider inviting lead-
ers from developed countries to their meetings, with a view to 
enabling them to fully appreciate the African version of the cli-
mate change debates. Seventh, they need to effectively engage 
the big GHG emitters, with a view to having them honor their 
pledges to reduce their emissions and support climate change 
adaptation and mitigation actions in Africa. Eighth, they need to 
engage the international community to break the long-standing 
lack of transparency at the Breton Woods institutions, in particu-
lar the World Bank.
Ninth, African governments have to invest in routine situ-
ational assessments in order to establish the progress, challenges 
and prospects in addressing climate change. In addition, they 
need to work towards breaking the reigning skepticism (through, 
for instance, broad-based social mobilization and dissemination 
on the interface between the environment and climate change. 
Further, the governments have to establish and sustain credible 
specialized institutions, preferably within the AU Commission 
framework, to coherently address climate change issues on the 
continent. In particular, they must prioritize the operationaliza-
tion of the AGF, while engaging the continent’s international 
development partners to sustainably support the initiative.
Last but not the least, African governments have to con-
sider subscribing to the Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity.132 The Protocol, which opened for signa-
ture and ratification on February 2, 2011, has the potential to 
promote more equitable distribution of genetic resources for the 
continent.
conclusIon
This article highlighted key challenges and prospects in sus-
taining the outcomes of ADF VII. Although immense challenges 
lie in the path to sustenance of the outcomes, there are equally 
immense prospects, which, if properly harnessed, can ultimately 
drive Africa towards effectively combating climate change. On 
the basis of the balance sheet of challenges and prospects, the 
article has offered measures that African governments must to 
adopt. These measures, though not an absolute panacea for the 
continent’s woes, have the potential to contribute to the cause of 
fighting the challenges posed by climate change and variability 
on the continent.
African leaders must improve the continent’s normative 
and institutional capacities to deal with the challenges posed 
by climate change. Undoubtedly, they cannot just sit and watch 
calamities unfold in series; the time has come for them to 
jointly and individually take action to avert the consequences 
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of climate change, if they are at all committed to saving Africa 
from fatal catastrophes. Otherwise, the continent’s hard-earned 
development gains may quickly erode, thereby subjecting more 
Africans to the curse of poverty for the foreseeable future.
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